149 lines
9.5 KiB
HTML
149 lines
9.5 KiB
HTML
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<title>Inferencium - Blog - Untrusted: The Issue with Decentralisation</title>
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<h1>Blog - #2</h1>
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<h2>Untrusted: The Issue with Decentralisation</h2>
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<p class="update_date">Posted: 2022-06-30 (UTC+00:00)</p>
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<p class="update_date">Updated: 2023-11-11 (UTC+00:00)</p>
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<nav id="toc">
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<h2><a href="#toc">Table of Contents</a></h2>
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<ul>
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<li><a href="#introduction">Introduction</a></li>
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<li><a href="#examples">Examples</a></li>
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<ul>
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<li><a href="#examples-messaging">Messaging</a></li>
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</ul>
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<li><a href="#solution">Solution</a></li>
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<li><a href="#conclusion">Conclusion</a></li>
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</ul>
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</nav>
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<section id="introduction">
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<h2><a href="#introduction">Introduction</a></h2>
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<p>A recent trend is seeing people move towards decentralised services and platforms. While this
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is reasonable and I can understand why they are doing such a thing, they are seemingly doing it
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without thinking about the possible consequences of doing so. The issue with decentralisation is
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trust; there is no way to pin a key to a specific person, to ensure that you are communicating
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with the same person you are supposed to be communicating with. In this article, I will discuss
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some of the security issues with the decentralised model.</p>
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</section>
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<section id="examples">
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<h2><a href="#examples">Examples</a></h2>
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<section id="examples-messaging">
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<h3><a href="#examples-messaging">Messaging</a></h3>
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<p>When it comes to messaging your contacts on a centralised platform, such as Twitter
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or Facebook, the keys are pinned to that user account, using the user's password as the
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method of identification. This approach makes it impossible to log in as a specific user
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without their password, should it be strong enough to not be guessed, whether via
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personal guessing or exhaustive search. The trust in this centralised model is the high
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security these platforms have. It is extremely unlikely that anyone other than a
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government would be able to access the accounts stored on such platforms' servers, which
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makes the physical security trusted. As for remote security, should a user's password be
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compromised, it can typically be reset if the user can prove they are the owner of the
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account via some form of identification; this is where the trust issue of
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decentralisation occurs.</p>
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<p>In the decentralised model, keys are kept on the users' devices, in their possession.
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While this soveriegnty is welcomed, it introduces a critical flaw in the security of
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communicating with anyone via a decentralised platform; should a user's device be lost,
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stolen, or otherwise compromised, there is no way to know it happened and what the new
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keys really are, and if the same user generated those keys. There is no centralised
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point where anyone can go to check if the compromised user has updated their keys, which
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means there must already have been at least one other secure channel in place before the
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compromise occurred. Even if there was, the security of endpoint devices, especially
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typical users, is much lower than a well protected corporation's servers, making even
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those secure channels questionable to trust. Should all secure channels be compromised,
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there is literally no way to know if the person you are communicating with is the real
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person or an imposter; there is no root of trust. This point is fatal; game over. The
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only way to establish trust again would be to physically meet and exchange keys.</p>
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</section>
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</section>
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<section id="solution">
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<h2><a href="#solution">Solution</a></h2>
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<p>I'll cut to the chase; there isn't a definitive solution. The best way to handle this
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situation is to design your threat model and think about your reasoning for avoiding centralised
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platforms. Is it lack of trust of a specific company? Is it the possibility of centralised
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platforms going offline? Only by thinking logically and tactically can you solve both the issue
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of centralisation and decentralisation. Often, one size fits all is never the correct approach,
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nor does it typically work.</p>
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<p>In order to avoid the issue of loss of trust due to lack of root of trust, all users' keys
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must be stored in a centralised location where all contacts are able to go to in case of
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compromise or to periodically check the state of keys and to see if they have changed. This
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centralised location requires some sort of identification to ensure that the user changing their
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keys is really the same person who initially signed up for the platform, using a
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trust-on-first-use (TOFU) model, which isn't much different than what today's centralised
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platforms are already doing; the only difference is who is controlling the location; trust is
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still present and required.</p>
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<p>In order to have a root of trust, I have posted my keys to my website, which
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is protected by multiple layers of security:</p>
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<ol>
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<li>I have provided identification to my domain name registrar, to ensure I can access
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the website I rightfully own, should it be compromised, by providing identification to
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the domain name registrar.</li>
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<li>I have provided identification to my virtual private server host, to ensure I can
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access the virtual private servers I rightfully rent, should they be compromised, by
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providing identification to the virtual private server host.</li>
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<li>I have pinned my website to a globally trusted certificate authority, Let's Encrypt,
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which is a trusted party to manage TLS certificates and ensure ownership of the domain
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when connecting to it.</li>
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<li>I have enabled DNSSEC on my domain, so it is extremely difficult to spoof my domain
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to make you believe you're connecting to it when you're actually connecting to someone
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else's.</li>
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</ol>
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<p>While not the most secure implementation of a root of trust, it is the most secure
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implementation currently available to me. While the domain name registrar or virtual private
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server host could tamper with my domain and data, they are the most trustworthy parties
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available. In its current form, decentralisation would make this impossible to implement in any
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form.</p>
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</section>
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<section id="conclusion">
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<h2><a href="#conclusion">Conclusion</a></h2>
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<p>Do not demand anonymity; demand privacy and control of your own data. Complete anonymity
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makes it impossible to have a root of trust, and is typically never necessary. It is possible
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for someone else to hold your keys, without them taking control of them and dictating what you
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can and cannot do (X's misinformation policy comes to mind). If a platform is not listening to
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your or other people's concerns about how it is being run, show those platforms that you will
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not stand for it, and move to a different one. This may not be ideal, but it's not different to
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moving from one decentralised platform to another. Centralisation is not what is evil, the
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people in control of the platforms are what is potentially evil. Carefully, logically, and
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tactically, choose who to trust. Decentralisation doesn't do much for trust when you must still
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trust the operator of the decentralised platform, and are still subject to the possibly
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draconian policies of that decentralised platform. If government is what you are trying to
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avoid, there is no denying it is feasibly impossible to avoid it; a government could always take
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down the decentralised platform, forcing you to move to another, and they could also take down
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the centralised key storage site mentioned earlier in this article. A government is not
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something you can so easily avoid. Decentralisation does not solve the government issue. In
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order to live a happy, fun, and fulfilled life, while protecting yourself against logical
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threats, there are only two words you must live by: Threat model.</p>
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</section>
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