Anyone who cares about security may want to switch from systemd as soon as
possible; its lead developer doesn't care about your security at all, and
makes the thing seem like an intentional government backdoor if I've ever
seen one.
Poettering:
"You don't assign CVEs to every single random bugfix we do, do you?"
My thoughts:
Uhh... Yes, if they're security related.
Source:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/5998
Poettering:
"Humpf, I am not convinced this is the right way to announce this.
We never did that, and half the CVEs aren't useful anyway, hence I am not
sure we should start with that now, because it is either inherently
incomplete or blesses the nonsensical part of the CVE circus which we
really shouldn't bless..."
My thoughts:
CVEs are supposed to be for security, and a log of when they were
found and their severity, so yes, it *is* the correct way to announce it.
It seems as if over 95 security concious people think the same.
Source:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/6225
Poettering:
"I am not sure I buy enough into the security circus to do that though for
any minor issue..."
Source:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/5144
Poettering:
"Yes, as you found out "0day" is not a valid username. I wonder which tool
permitted you to create it in the first place. Note that not permitting
numeric first characters is done on purpose: to avoid ambiguities between
numeric UID and textual user names.
systemd will validate all configuration data you drop at it, making it hard
to generate invalid configuration. Hence, yes, it's a feature that we don't
permit invalid user names, and I'd consider it a limitation of xinetd that
it doesn't refuse an invalid username.
So, yeah, I don't think there's anything to fix in systemd here. I
understand this is annoying, but still: the username is clearly not valid."
My thoughts:
systemd was the thing that allowed root access just because a username
started with a number.
Source:
https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237