Add Google Pixel 6 sources. Improve text.
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@ -71,36 +71,49 @@
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<br>
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They also include a
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<a class="table-link" href="https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore#HardwareSecurityModule">hardware security module</a>
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(Titan M2, improving on the first generation
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(Titan M2, improving on the previous generation
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<a class="table-link" href="https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/building-titan-better-security-through.html">Titan M</a>)
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which is extremely resistant to both remote and physical attacks due to being
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completely isolated from the rest of the system, including the operating system.
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Titan M2 ensures that the device cannot be remotely compromised by requiring the
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side buttons of the device to be physically pressed for some sensitive operations.
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Titan M2 also takes the role of
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<a class="table-link" href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/best-practices/hardware#strongbox-keymaster">Android Strongbox Keymaster</a>,
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<a class="table-link" href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/best-practices/hardware#strongbox-keymaster">Android StrongBox Keymaster</a>,
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a <a class="table-link" href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/keystore">hardware-backed Keystore</a>
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containing sensitive user keys which are unavailable to
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the OS or apps running on it without authorisation from Titan M2 itself. Insider attack
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resistance ensures that Titan M2 firmware can be flashed only if the user PIN/password
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the OS or apps running on it without authorisation from Titan M2 itself.
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<a class="table-link" href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/05/insider-attack-resistance.html">Insider attack
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resistance</a> ensures that Titan M2 firmware can be flashed only if the user PIN/password
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is already known, making it impossible to backdoor the device without already knowing
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these secrets.<br>
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<br>
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Google Pixel device kernels are compiled with fine-grained, forward-edge control-flow
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integrity and backward-edge control-flow integrity to prevent code reuse attacks against
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the kernel. MAC address randomisation is implemented well, with minimal probe requests
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and randomised initial sequence numbers.<br>
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Google Pixel device kernels are compiled with
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<a class="table-link" href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/control-flow-integrity-in-android-kernel.html"
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>forward-edge control-flow integrity</a> and
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<a class="table-link" href="https://security.googleblog.com/2019/10/protecting-against-code-reuse-in-linux_30.html"
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>backward-edge control-flow integrity</a> to prevent code reuse attacks against
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the kernel. MAC address randomisation is
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<a class="table-link" href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/changes-to-device-identifiers-in.html"
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>implemented well, along with minimal probe requests and randomised initial sequence numbers</a>.<br>
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<br>
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Google releases guaranteed monthly security updates, ensuring Google Pixel devices are
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Google releases
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<a class="table-link" href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/"
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>guaranteed monthly security updates</a>, ensuring Google Pixel devices are
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up-to-date and quickly protected against security vulnerabilities.<br>
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<br>
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Pixel 6-series devices are a large improvement over the already very secure and private
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previous generation Pixel devices. They replace ARM-based Titan M with RISC-V-based Titan M2,
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reducing trust by removing ARM from the equation. Titan M2 is more resiliant to attacks than
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Titan M, and is AVA_VAN.5 certified, the highest level of vulnerability assessment. Google's
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Titan M, and is
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<a class="table-link" href="https://www.tuv-nederland.nl/assets/files/cerfiticaten/2022/09/nscib-cc-22-0228971-cert-final.pdf"
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>AVA_VAN.5 certified</a>, the highest level of vulnerability assessment. Google's
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in-house Tensor SoC includes Tensor Security Core, further improving device security.<br>
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Pixel 6-series devices are supported for a minimum of 5 years from launch, an increase from
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previous generations' support lifecycles of 3 years.</td>
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Pixel 6-series devices are supported for a
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<a class="table-link" href="https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705#zippy=%2Cpixel-and-later"
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>minimum of 5 years from launch</a>, an increase from
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previous generations'
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<a class="table-link" href="https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705#zippy=%2Cpixel-xl-a-a-g-and-a-g"
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>support lifecycles of 3 years</a>.</td>
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</tr>
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</table>
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<br>
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