- Inferencium-
-
- - - - -
Posted: 2022-01-27 (UTC+00:00)
-Updated: 2022-11-09 (UTC+00:00)
-The world has become a dangerous, privacy invading, human rights stripping, totalitarian place; -in order to combat this, people are joining a growing, and dangerous, trend, which I will refer to -in this post as the "Free and Open Source (FOSS) movement". With that stated, I will now debunk the -misinformation being spread inside of this extremely flawed movement.
-The -FOSS movement is an attempt to regain -privacy and -control over our devices and data, but the entire concept of FOSS-only, at the current time, is -severely, and dangerously, flawed. What the FOSS community does not seem to understand is the fact -that most FOSS software cares not about -security. -"Security"; keep that word in mind as you progress through this article. What is security? Security -is being safe and secure from adversaries and unwanted consequences; security protects our rights -and allows us to protect ourselves. Without security, we have no protection, and without protection, -we have a lack of certainty of everything else, including privacy and control, which is what the -FOSS movement is seeking.
-FOSS projects rarely take security into account; they simply look at the surface level, rather -than the actual -root cause of the issues they are attempting to fight against. In this case, the focus is on -privacy and control. Without security mechanisms to protect the privacy features and the ability to -control your devices and data, it can be stripped away as if it never existed in the first place, -which, inevitably, leads us back to the beginning, and the cycle repeats. With this -ideology, privacy and control will *never* be achieved. There is no foundation to build privacy -or control upon. It is impossible to build a solid, freedom respecting platform on this model.
-A FOSS phone, especially so-called -"Linux phones" are completely -detrimental to privacy and control, because they do not have the security necessary to enforce that -privacy. -Unlocked bootloaders prevent the device from -verifying the integrity of the boot chain, including the OS, meaning any adversary, whether a -stranger who happens to pick up the device, or a big tech or government entity, can simply inject -malicious code into your software and you wouldn't have any idea it was there. If that's not enough -of a backdoor for you to reconsider your position, how about the trivial -evil maid and data extraction attacks which could be executed on your device, without coercion? -With Android phones, this is bad enough to completely break the privacy and control the FOSS -movement seeks, but "Linux phones" take it a step further by implementing barely any security, if -any at all. -Privilege escalation is trivial to achieve on any Linux system, which is the reason Linux -hardening strategies often include restricting access to the root account; if you -root your Android phone, or use a "Linux phone", you've already destroyed the security model, -and thus privacy and control model you were attempting to achieve. Not only are these side effects -of FOSS, so is the absolutely illogical restriction of not being able to, or making it unnecessarily -difficult to, install and update critical components of the system, such as proprietary -firmware, which just so happens to be almost all of them. "Linux phones" are not as free as -they proclaim to be.
-You may ask "What's so bad about using
-LineageOS?", to which I answer with "What's not bad about it?".
-
-- LineageOS uses
-debug builds, not safe and secure release builds.
-- LineageOS requires an unlocked bootloader. Even when installed on devices which support custom
-Android Verified Boot (AVB) keys, the bootloader cannot be locked due to lack of the OS being
-signed.
-- LineageOS does not install critically important firmware without manual flashing, requiring users
-to perform a second update to install this firmware; this likely causes users to ignore the
-notification or miss firmware updates.
-- LineageOS does not implement
-rollback protection, meaning any adversary, from a stranger who physically picks up the device,
-to a goverment entity remotely, can simply downgrade the OS to a previous version in order to
-exploit known
-security vulnerabilities.
-
-LineageOS is not the only Android OS (commonly, and incorrectly, referred to as a "ROM") with such
-issues, but it is one of the worst. The only things such insecure OSes can provide you are
-customisation abilities, and a backdoor to your data. They are best suited as a development OS, not
-a production OS.
What can you do about this? The answer is simple; however, it does require you to use logic, -fact, and evidence, not emotion, which is a difficult pill for most people to swallow. Use your -adversaries' weapons against them. The only way to effectively combat the privacy invasion and lack -of control of our devices and data is to become a -renegade and not take sides. Yes, that means not taking sides with the closed source, -proprietary, big tech and government entities, but it also means not taking sides with any -FOSS entities. The only way to win this war is to take *whatever* hardware and software you can, and -use it tactically.
-The only solution for phone security, privacy, and control, is to use a Google Pixel (currently, -Pixel 4a-series or newer) running -GrapheneOS. Google Pixel phones allow you complete bootloader freedom, including the -ability to lock the bootloader after flashing a custom OS -(GrapheneOS includes a custom OS signing key to allow locking the bootloader and enabling verified -boot to prevent -malware persistence, evil maid attacks, and boot chain -corruption), -long device support lifecycles (minimum 3 years for Pixel 4a-series to Pixel 5a, minimum 5 -years for Pixel 6-series and newer), and -guaranteed monthly security updates for the entire support timeframe of the devices.
-Use what you can, and do what you can. By neglecting security, you are, even if unintentionally, -neglecting exactly what you are trying to gain; privacy and control.
-