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<!-- Copyright 2022-2023 Jake Winters --> <!-- Copyright 2022-2023 Jake Winters -->
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<br> <br>
<br> <br>
<h2>FOSS is Working Against Itself</h2> <h2>FOSS is Working Against Itself</h2>
<br> <br>
<p class="update_date">Posted: 2022-01-27 (UTC+00:00)</p> <p class="update_date">Posted: 2022-01-27 (UTC+00:00)</p>
<p class="update_date">Updated: 2022-11-09 (UTC+00:00)</p> <p class="update_date">Updated: 2022-11-09 (UTC+00:00)</p>
<br> <br>
<h4>Introduction</h4> <!-- Table of contents. -->
<p>The world has become a dangerous, privacy invading, human rights stripping, totalitarian place; <h2 id="toc"><a href="#toc" class="h2"
in order to combat this, people are joining a growing, and dangerous, trend, which I will refer to >Table of Contents<a/></h2>
in this post as the "Free and Open Source (FOSS) movement". With that stated, I will now debunk the <ul>
misinformation being spread inside of this extremely flawed movement.</p> <li><a href="#introduction" class="body-link"
<br> >Introduction</a></li>
<p>The <li><a href="#examples" class="body-link"
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_software" >Examples</a></li>
>FOSS</a> movement is an attempt to regain <ul>
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy" <li><a href="#example-smartphones" class="body-link"
>privacy</a> and >Smartphones</a></li>
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_(psychology)" </ul>
>control</a> over our devices and data, but the entire concept of FOSS-only, at the current time, is <li><a href="#solution" class="body-link"
severely, and dangerously, flawed. What the FOSS community does not seem to understand is the fact >Solution</a></li>
that most FOSS software cares not about <li><a href="#conclusion" class="body-link"
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security" >Conclusion</a></li>
>security</a>. </ul>
"Security"; keep that word in mind as you progress through this article. What is security? Security
is being safe and secure from adversaries and unwanted consequences; security protects our rights <h4 id=introduction"><a href="#introduction" class="h4"
and allows us to protect ourselves. Without security, we have no protection, and without protection, >Introduction</a></h4>
we have a lack of certainty of everything else, including privacy and control, which is what the <p>The world has become a dangerous, privacy invading, human rights stripping, totalitarian place;
FOSS movement is seeking.</p> in order to combat this, people are joining a growing, and dangerous, trend, which I will refer to
<br> in this post as the "Free and Open Source (FOSS) movement". With that stated, I will now debunk the
<p>FOSS projects rarely take security into account; they simply look at the surface level, rather misinformation being spread inside of this extremely flawed movement.</p>
than the actual <br>
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_cause_analysis" <p>The
>root cause</a> of the issues they are attempting to fight against. In this case, the focus is on <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_software"
privacy and control. Without security mechanisms to protect the privacy features and the ability to >FOSS</a> movement is an attempt to regain
control your devices and data, it can be stripped away as if it never existed in the first place, <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privacy"
which, inevitably, leads us back to the beginning, and the cycle repeats. With this >privacy</a> and
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideology" <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Control_(psychology)"
>ideology</a>, privacy and control will *never* be achieved. There is no foundation to build privacy >control</a> over our devices and data, but the entire concept of FOSS-only, at the current time, is
or control upon. It is impossible to build a solid, freedom respecting platform on this model.</p> severely, and dangerously, flawed. What the FOSS community does not seem to understand is the fact
<br> that most FOSS software cares not about
<h4>Example: Smartphones</h4> <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Security"
<p>A FOSS phone, especially so-called >security</a>.
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_for_mobile_devices#Smartphones" "Security"; keep that word in mind as you progress through this article. What is security? Security
>"Linux phones"</a> are completely is being safe and secure from adversaries and unwanted consequences; security protects our rights
detrimental to privacy and control, because they do not have the security necessary to enforce that and allows us to protect ourselves. Without security, we have no protection, and without protection,
privacy. we have a lack of certainty of everything else, including privacy and control, which is what the
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootloader_unlocking" FOSS movement is seeking.</p>
>Unlocked bootloaders</a> prevent the device from <br>
<a class="body-link" href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/" <p>FOSS projects rarely take security into account; they simply look at the surface level, rather
>verifying the integrity of the boot chain</a>, including the OS, meaning any adversary, whether a than the actual
stranger who happens to pick up the device, or a big tech or government entity, can simply inject <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Root_cause_analysis"
malicious code into your software and you wouldn't have any idea it was there. If that's not enough >root cause</a> of the issues they are attempting to fight against. In this case, the focus is on
of a backdoor for you to reconsider your position, how about the trivial privacy and control. Without security mechanisms to protect the privacy features and the ability to
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack" control your devices and data, it can be stripped away as if it never existed in the first place,
>evil maid</a> and data extraction attacks which could be executed on your device, without coercion? which, inevitably, leads us back to the beginning, and the cycle repeats. With this
With Android phones, this is bad enough to completely break the privacy and control the FOSS <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ideology"
movement seeks, but "Linux phones" take it a step further by implementing barely any security, if >ideology</a>, privacy and control will *never* be achieved. There is no foundation to build privacy
any at all. or control upon. It is impossible to build a solid, freedom respecting platform on this model.</p>
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation" <br>
>Privilege escalation</a> is trivial to achieve on any Linux system, which is the reason Linux
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)" <h4 id="examples"><a href="#examples" class="h4"
>hardening</a> strategies often include restricting access to the root account; if you >Examples</a></h4>
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)" <br>
>root your Android phone</a>, or use a "Linux phone", you've already destroyed the security model, <h5 id="example-smartphones"><a href="#example-smartphones"
and thus privacy and control model you were attempting to achieve. Not only are these side effects >Smartphones</a></h5>
of FOSS, so is the absolutely illogical restriction of not being able to, or making it unnecessarily <p>A FOSS phone, especially so-called
difficult to, install and update critical components of the system, such as proprietary <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Linux_for_mobile_devices#Smartphones"
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firmware" >"Linux phones"</a> are completely
>firmware</a>, which just so happens to be almost all of them. "Linux phones" are not as free as detrimental to privacy and control, because they do not have the security necessary to enforce that
they proclaim to be.</p> privacy.
<br> <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bootloader_unlocking"
<p>You may ask "What's so bad about using >Unlocked bootloaders</a> prevent the device from
<a class="body-link" href="https://lineageos.org/" <a class="body-link" href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/"
>LineageOS</a>?", to which I answer with "What's not bad about it?".<br> >verifying the integrity of the boot chain</a>, including the OS, meaning any adversary, whether a
<br> stranger who happens to pick up the device, or a big tech or government entity, can simply inject
- LineageOS uses malicious code into your software and you wouldn't have any idea it was there. If that's not enough
<a class="body-link" href="https://github.com/LineageOS/hudson/blob/master/lineage-build-targets" of a backdoor for you to reconsider your position, how about the trivial
>debug builds</a>, not safe and secure release builds.<br> <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Evil_maid_attack"
- LineageOS requires an unlocked bootloader. Even when installed on devices which support custom >evil maid</a> and data extraction attacks which could be executed on your device, without coercion?
Android Verified Boot (AVB) keys, the bootloader cannot be locked due to lack of the OS being With Android phones, this is bad enough to completely break the privacy and control the FOSS
signed.<br> movement seeks, but "Linux phones" take it a step further by implementing barely any security, if
- LineageOS does not install critically important firmware without manual flashing, requiring users any at all.
to perform a second update to install this firmware; this likely causes users to ignore the <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Privilege_escalation"
notification or miss firmware updates.<br> >Privilege escalation</a> is trivial to achieve on any Linux system, which is the reason Linux
- LineageOS does not implement <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hardening_(computing)"
<a class="body-link" href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/ >hardening</a> strategies often include restricting access to the root account; if you
verified-boot#rollback-protection" <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Rooting_(Android)"
>rollback protection</a>, meaning any adversary, from a stranger who physically picks up the device, >root your Android phone</a>, or use a "Linux phone", you've already destroyed the security model,
to a goverment entity remotely, can simply downgrade the OS to a previous version in order to and thus privacy and control model you were attempting to achieve. Not only are these side effects
exploit known of FOSS, so is the absolutely illogical restriction of not being able to, or making it unnecessarily
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulnerability_(computing)" difficult to, install and update critical components of the system, such as proprietary
>security vulnerabilities</a>.<br> <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Firmware"
<br> >firmware</a>, which just so happens to be almost all of them. "Linux phones" are not as free as
LineageOS is not the only Android OS (commonly, and incorrectly, referred to as a "ROM") with such they proclaim to be.</p>
issues, but it is one of the worst. The only things such insecure OSes can provide you are <br>
customisation abilities, and a backdoor to your data. They are best suited as a development OS, not <p>You may ask "What's so bad about using
a production OS.</p> <a class="body-link" href="https://lineageos.org/"
<br> >LineageOS</a>?", to which I answer with "What's not bad about it?".<br>
<h4>Solution</h4> <br>
<p>What can you do about this? The answer is simple; however, it does require you to use logic, - LineageOS uses
fact, and evidence, not emotion, which is a difficult pill for most people to swallow. Use your <a class="body-link" href="https://github.com/LineageOS/hudson/blob/master/lineage-build-targets"
adversaries' weapons against them. The only way to effectively combat the privacy invasion and lack >debug builds</a>, not safe and secure release builds.<br>
of control of our devices and data is to become a - LineageOS requires an unlocked bootloader. Even when installed on devices which support custom
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turncoat" Android Verified Boot (AVB) keys, the bootloader cannot be locked due to lack of the OS being
>renegade</a> and not take sides. Yes, that means not taking sides with the closed source, signed.<br>
proprietary, big tech and government entities, but it also means not taking sides with any - LineageOS does not install critically important firmware without manual flashing, requiring users
FOSS entities. The only way to win this war is to take *whatever* hardware and software you can, and to perform a second update to install this firmware; this likely causes users to ignore the
use it tactically.</p> notification or miss firmware updates.<br>
<br> - LineageOS does not implement
<p>The only solution for phone security, privacy, and control, is to use a Google Pixel (currently, <a class="body-link" href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/
Pixel 4a-series or newer) running verified-boot#rollback-protection"
<a class="body-link" href="https://grapheneos.org/" >rollback protection</a>, meaning any adversary, from a stranger who physically picks up the device,
>GrapheneOS</a>. Google Pixel phones allow you complete bootloader freedom, including the to a goverment entity remotely, can simply downgrade the OS to a previous version in order to
<a class="body-link" href="https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/master/README.md#pixel-2-and-later" exploit known
>ability to lock the bootloader after flashing a custom OS</a> <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vulnerability_(computing)"
(GrapheneOS includes a custom OS signing key to allow locking the bootloader and enabling verified >security vulnerabilities</a>.<br>
boot to prevent <br>
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malware" LineageOS is not the only Android OS (commonly, and incorrectly, referred to as a "ROM") with such
>malware</a> persistence, evil maid attacks, and boot chain issues, but it is one of the worst. The only things such insecure OSes can provide you are
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_corruption" customisation abilities, and a backdoor to your data. They are best suited as a development OS, not
>corruption</a>), a production OS.</p>
<a class="body-link" href="https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705" <br>
>long device support lifecycles</a> (minimum 3 years for Pixel 4a-series to Pixel 5a, minimum 5 <h4 id="solution"><a href="#solution" class="h4">Solution</a></h4>
years for Pixel 6-series and newer), and <p>What can you do about this? The answer is simple; however, it does require you to use logic,
<a class="body-link" href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/" fact, and evidence, not emotion, which is a difficult pill for most people to swallow. Use your
>guaranteed monthly security updates</a> for the entire support timeframe of the devices.</p> adversaries' weapons against them. The only way to effectively combat the privacy invasion and lack
<br> of control of our devices and data is to become a
<h4>Conclusion</h4> <a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Turncoat"
<p>Use what you can, and do what you can. By neglecting security, you are, even if unintentionally, >renegade</a> and not take sides. Yes, that means not taking sides with the closed source,
neglecting exactly what you are trying to gain; privacy and control.</p> proprietary, big tech and government entities, but it also means not taking sides with any
<br> FOSS entities. The only way to win this war is to take *whatever* hardware and software you can, and
<br> use it tactically.</p>
<br>
<p>The only solution for phone security, privacy, and control, is to use a Google Pixel (currently,
Pixel 4a-series or newer) running
<a class="body-link" href="https://grapheneos.org/"
>GrapheneOS</a>. Google Pixel phones allow you complete bootloader freedom, including the
<a class="body-link" href="https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/master/README.md#pixel-2-and-later"
>ability to lock the bootloader after flashing a custom OS</a>
(GrapheneOS includes a custom OS signing key to allow locking the bootloader and enabling verified
boot to prevent
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Malware"
>malware</a> persistence, evil maid attacks, and boot chain
<a class="body-link" href="https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Data_corruption"
>corruption</a>),
<a class="body-link" href="https://support.google.com/nexus/answer/4457705"
>long device support lifecycles</a> (minimum 3 years for Pixel 4a-series to Pixel 5a, minimum 5
years for Pixel 6-series and newer), and
<a class="body-link" href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/"
>guaranteed monthly security updates</a> for the entire support timeframe of the devices.</p>
<br>
<h4 id="conclusion"><a href="#conclusion" class="h4">Conclusion</a></h4>
<p>Use what you can, and do what you can. By neglecting security, you are, even if unintentionally,
neglecting exactly what you are trying to gain; privacy and control.</p>
<br>
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