Add section Hardware I Use. Add Google Pixel 6 table row. Improve text.

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inference 2022-10-31 00:27:24 +00:00
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@ -35,6 +35,62 @@
being affected.</p> being affected.</p>
<br> <br>
<br> <br>
<h3>Hardware I Use</h3>
<h4>Smartphone</h4>
<table>
<tr>
<td>Type</td>
<td>Hardware</td>
<td>Description</td>
<td>Source model<br>
<br>
(License)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Smartphone</td>
<td><img src="img/google-pixel_6.png" width="100px" height="100px"/><br>
<br>
Google Pixel 6</td>
<td>Google Pixel devices are the best Android devices available on
the market for security and privacy.<br>
<br>
They allow locking the bootloader with a custom Android Verified Boot (AVB)
key in order to preserve security and privacy features when installing a custom
operating system, such as verified boot which verifies that the OS has not been
corrupted or tampered with, and rollback protection which prevents an adversary
from rolling back the OS or firmware version to a previous version with known
security vulnerabilities.<br>
<br>
They also include a hardware security module (Titan M2) which is extremely resistant
to both remote and physical attacks due to being completely isolated from
the rest of the system, including the operating system. Titan M2 ensures that
the device cannot be remotely compromised by requiring the side buttons of the
device to be physically pressed for some sensitive operations. Titan M2 also
takes the role of Android Strongbox keystore, containing sensitive user keys which
are unavailable to the OS or apps running on it without authorisation from Titan M2
itself. Insider attack resistance ensures that Titan M2 firmware can be flashed only
if the user PIN/password is already known, making it impossible to backdoor the device
without already knowing these secrets.<br>
<br>
Google Pixel device kernels are compiled with fine-grained, forward-edge control-flow
integrity and backward-edge control-flow integrity to prevent code reuse attacks against
the kernel. MAC address randomisation is implemented well, with minimal probe requests
and randomised initial sequence numbers.<br>
<br>
Google releases guaranteed monthly security updates, ensuring Google Pixel devices are
up-to-date and quickly protected against security vulnerabilities.<br>
<br>
Pixel 6-series devices are a large improvement over the already very secure and private
previous generation Pixel devices. They replace ARM-based Titan M with RISC-V-based Titan M2,
reducing trust by removing ARM from the equation. Titan M2 is more resiliant to attacks than
Titan M, and is AVA_VAN.5 certified, the highest level of vulnerability assessment. Google's
in-house Tensor SoC includes Tensor Security Core, further improving device security.<br>
Pixel 6-series devices are supported for a minimum of 5 years from launch, an increase from
previous generations' support lifecycles of 3 years.</td>
</tr>
</table>
<br>
<br>
<h3>Software I Use</h3> <h3>Software I Use</h3>
<h4>Desktop</h4> <h4>Desktop</h4>
<table> <table>
@ -43,6 +99,7 @@
<td>Software</td> <td>Software</td>
<td>Description</td> <td>Description</td>
<td>Source model<br> <td>Source model<br>
<br>
(License)</td> (License)</td>
</tr> </tr>
<tr> <tr>
@ -56,12 +113,13 @@
being the ability to optimise the software for security, privacy, performance, being the ability to optimise the software for security, privacy, performance,
or power usage; however, there are effectively unlimited other use cases, or a or power usage; however, there are effectively unlimited other use cases, or a
combination of multiple use cases.<br> combination of multiple use cases.<br>
<br>
I have focused on security hardening and privacy hardening, placing performance below I have focused on security hardening and privacy hardening, placing performance below
those aspects, although my system is still very performant. Some of the hardening I those aspects, although my system is still very performant. Some of the hardening I
apply includes stack protection, signed integer overflow wrapping, and GrapheneOS' apply includes stack protection, signed integer overflow wrapping, and GrapheneOS'
hardened_malloc memory allocator.<br> hardened_malloc memory allocator.<br>
<br> <br>
You can find my personal Gentoo Linux hardening configuration You can find my personal Gentoo Linux configuration
<a class="table-link" href="https://git.inferencium.net/inference/cfg/">here</a>.</td> <a class="table-link" href="https://git.inferencium.net/inference/cfg/">here</a>.</td>
<td>Open source<br> <td>Open source<br>
<br> <br>
@ -133,10 +191,10 @@
Vanadium</td> Vanadium</td>
<td>Vanadium is a security-hardened, privacy-hardened Chromium-based web browser <td>Vanadium is a security-hardened, privacy-hardened Chromium-based web browser
which utilises GrapheneOS' operating system hardening to implement stronger which utilises GrapheneOS' operating system hardening to implement stronger
defenses to the already very secure Chromium web browser. Its hardening includes defenses to the already very secure Chromium web browser. Its hardening alongside
disabling JavaScript just-in-time (JIT) compilation by default, stubbing out the Chromium's base security features includes disabling JavaScript just-in-time (JIT)
battery status API to prevent abuse of it, and always-on compilation by default, stubbing out the battery status API to prevent abuse of it,
Incognito mode as an option.<br> and always-on Incognito mode as an option.<br>
<br> <br>
Vanadium's source code repository, including its Chromium patchset, can be found Vanadium's source code repository, including its Chromium patchset, can be found
<a class="table-link" href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/">here</a>.</td> <a class="table-link" href="https://github.com/GrapheneOS/Vanadium/">here</a>.</td>

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