Add Google Pixel section "Security/Privacy"
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about.html
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about.html
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<!DOCTYPE html>
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<!DOCTYPE html>
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<!-- Inferencium - Website - About -->
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<!-- Inferencium - Website - About -->
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<!-- Version: 6.3.0-alpha.8 -->
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<!-- Version: 6.3.0-alpha.9 -->
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<!-- Copyright 2022 Jake Winters -->
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<!-- Copyright 2022 Jake Winters -->
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<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
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<!-- SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause -->
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Google Pixel
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Google Pixel
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</td>
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</td>
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<td class="desc">
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<td class="desc">
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<p>Google Pixel devices are
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<h5>Security/Privacy</h5>
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the best Android devices
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<p>Google Pixel devices
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available on the market
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are the best Android
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for
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devices available on the
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<a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html">security and privacy</a>.</p>
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market for
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<p>They allow locking the
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<a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2021/10/pixel-6-setting-new-standard-for-mobile.html">security and privacy</a>.</p>
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bootloader with a
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<p>They allow locking
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<a href="https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/master/README.md#pixel-2-and-later">custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) key</a>
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the bootloader with a
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in order to preserve security
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<a href="https://android.googlesource.com/platform/external/avb/+/master/README.md#pixel-2-and-later">custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) key</a>
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and privacy features when
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in order to preserve
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installing a custom operating
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security and privacy
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system, such as
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features when installing
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<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/">verified boot</a>
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a custom operating
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which verifies that the OS has
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system, such as
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not been corrupted or tampered
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<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/">verified boot</a>
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with, and
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which verifies that the
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<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection">rollback protection</a>
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OS has not been
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which prevents an adversary from
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corrupted or tampered
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rolling back the OS or firmware
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with, and
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version to a previous version
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<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/verifiedboot/verified-boot#rollback-protection">rollback protection</a>
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with known security vulnerabilities.</p>
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which prevents an
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<p>They also include a
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adversary from rolling
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<a href="https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore#HardwareSecurityModule">hardware security module</a>
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back the OS or firmware
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(Titan M2, improving on the
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version to a previous
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previous generation
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version with known
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<a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/building-titan-better-security-through.html">Titan M</a>)
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security vulnerabilities.</p>
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which is extremely resistant to
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<p>They also include a
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both remote and physical attacks
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<a href="https://developer.android.com/training/articles/keystore#HardwareSecurityModule">hardware security module</a>
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due to being completely isolated
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(Titan M2, improving on
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from the rest of the system,
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the previous generation
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including the operating system.
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<a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2018/10/building-titan-better-security-through.html">Titan M</a>)
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Titan M2 ensures that the device
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which is extremely
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cannot be remotely compromised
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resistant to both remote
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by requiring the side buttons of
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and physical attacks due
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the device to be physically
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to being completely
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pressed for some sensitive
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isolated from the rest
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operations. Titan M2 also takes
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of the system, including
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the role of
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the operating system.
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<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/best-practices/hardware#strongbox-keymaster">Android StrongBox Keymaster</a>,
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Titan M2 ensures that
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a
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the device cannot be
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<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/keystore">hardware-backed Keystore</a>
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remotely compromised by
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containing sensitive user keys
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requiring the side
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which are unavailable to the OS
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buttons of the device to
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or apps running on it without
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be physically pressed
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authorisation from Titan M2 itself.
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for some sensitive
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<a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/05/insider-attack-resistance.html">Insider attack resistance</a>
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operations. Titan M2
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ensures that Titan M2 firmware
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also takes the role of
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can be flashed only if the user
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<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/best-practices/hardware#strongbox-keymaster">Android StrongBox Keymaster</a>,
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PIN/password is already known,
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a
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making it impossible to backdoor
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<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/features/keystore">hardware-backed Keystore</a>
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the device without already
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containing sensitive
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knowing these secrets.</p>
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user keys which are
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<p>Google Pixel device kernels
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unavailable to the OS or
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are compiled with
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apps running on it
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<a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/control-flow-integrity-in-android-kernel.html">forward-edge control-flow integrity</a>
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without authorisation
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and
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from Titan M2 itself.
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<a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2019/10/protecting-against-code-reuse-in-linux_30.html">backward-edge control-flow integrity</a>
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<a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/05/insider-attack-resistance.html">Insider attack resistance</a>
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to prevent code reuse attacks
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ensures that Titan M2
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against the kernel. MAC address
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firmware can be flashed
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randomisation is
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only if the user
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<a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/changes-to-device-identifiers-in.html">implemented well, along with minimal probe requests and randomised initial sequence numbers</a>.</p>
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PIN/password is already
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<p>Google releases
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known, making it
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<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/">guaranteed monthly security updates</a>,
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impossible to backdoor
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ensuring Google Pixel devices
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the device without
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are up-to-date and quickly
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already knowing these
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protected against security
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secrets.</p>
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vulnerabilities.</p>
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<p>Google Pixel device
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<p>Pixel 6-series and 7-series
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kernels are compiled
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devices are a large improvement
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with
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over the already very secure and
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<a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2018/10/control-flow-integrity-in-android-kernel.html">forward-edge control-flow integrity</a>
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private previous generation
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and
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Pixel devices. They replace
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<a href="https://security.googleblog.com/2019/10/protecting-against-code-reuse-in-linux_30.html">backward-edge control-flow integrity</a>
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ARM-based Titan M with
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to prevent code reuse
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RISC-V-based Titan M2, reducing
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attacks against the
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trust by removing ARM from the
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kernel. MAC address
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equation. Titan M2 is more
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randomisation is
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resiliant to attacks than Titan
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<a href="https://android-developers.googleblog.com/2017/04/changes-to-device-identifiers-in.html">implemented well, along with minimal probe requests and randomised initial sequence numbers</a>.</p>
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M, and is
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<p>Google releases
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<a href="https://www.tuv-nederland.nl/assets/files/cerfiticaten/2022/09/nscib-cc-22-0228971-cert-final.pdf">AVA_VAN.5 certified</a>,
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<a href="https://source.android.com/docs/security/bulletin/pixel/">guaranteed monthly security updates</a>,
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the highest level of
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ensuring Google Pixel
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vulnerability assessment.
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devices are up-to-date
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Google's in-house Tensor
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and quickly protected
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System-on-Chip includes Tensor
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against security
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Security Core, further improving
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vulnerabilities.</p>
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device security.<br>
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<p>Pixel 6-series and
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Pixel 8-series includes Armv9's
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7-series devices are a
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<a href="https://community.arm.com/arm-community-blogs/b/architectures-and-processors-blog/posts/enhanced-security-through-mte">Memory Tagging Extension</a>,
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large improvement over
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which dramatically increases
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the already very secure
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device security by eliminating
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and private previous
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up to 95% of all security issues
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generation Pixel
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caused by memory-unsafety.</p>
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devices. They replace
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ARM-based Titan M with
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RISC-V-based Titan M2,
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reducing trust by
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removing ARM from the
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equation. Titan M2 is
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more resiliant to
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attacks than Titan M,
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and is
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<a href="https://www.tuv-nederland.nl/assets/files/cerfiticaten/2022/09/nscib-cc-22-0228971-cert-final.pdf">AVA_VAN.5 certified</a>,
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the highest level of
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vulnerability
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assessment. Google's
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in-house Tensor
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System-on-Chip includes
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Tensor Security Core,
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further improving device
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security.</p>
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<p>Pixel 8-series
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includes Armv9's
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<a href="https://community.arm.com/arm-community-blogs/b/architectures-and-processors-blog/posts/enhanced-security-through-mte">Memory Tagging Extension</a>,
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which dramatically
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increases device
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security by eliminating
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up to 95% of all
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security issues caused
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by memory-unsafety.</p>
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<h5>Support</h5>
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<h5>Support</h5>
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<p>Pixel 4a (5G), Pixel
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<p>Pixel 4a (5G), Pixel
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5, and Pixel 5a, are
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5, and Pixel 5a, are
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