Website Major Redesign
This commit is contained in:
commit
4e813bed11
37
about.html
37
about.html
@ -4,27 +4,34 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - About</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href=infnet.css>
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>About</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h3>About Me</h3>
|
||||
<p>I am Inference, a cybersecurity researcher based in United Kingdom.<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>I write about my research and experience in cybersecurity and also<br>
|
||||
physical security. Most of my postings are security-related, but I<br>
|
||||
occasionally post about other aspects of my life.</p>
|
||||
<p>I write about my research and experience in cybersecurity and also physical
|
||||
security. Most of my postings are security-related, but I occasionally post
|
||||
about other aspects of my life.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>I am an open source advocate for the preservation and modifiability of<br>
|
||||
source code. I believe source code should be considered human knowledge as<br>
|
||||
much as past knowledge and teachings were; it is how modern humanity<br>
|
||||
survives and runs. Source code being modifiable allows it to be adapted<br>
|
||||
for use by anyone, whether to add features, harden it, or provide<br>
|
||||
accessibility for disabled people.<br>
|
||||
I am also a modular design advocate for the ability to securely and<br>
|
||||
robustly make changes to hardware and software without the entire system<br>
|
||||
<p>I am an open source advocate for the preservation and modifiability of
|
||||
source code. I believe source code should be considered human knowledge as
|
||||
much as past knowledge and teachings were; it is how modern humanity
|
||||
survives and runs.<br>
|
||||
Source code being modifiable allows it to be adapted
|
||||
for use by anyone, whether to add features, harden it for increased security
|
||||
and/or privacy, or provide accessibility for disabled users.<br>
|
||||
I am also a modular design advocate for the ability to securely and
|
||||
robustly make changes to hardware and software without the entire system
|
||||
being affected.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="index.html">Back</a>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
23
blog.html
23
blog.html
@ -4,22 +4,29 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Blog</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="infnet.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Blog</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h2>2022-06-30</h2>
|
||||
<p>#2 - <a href="blog/untrusted-the-issue-with-decentralisation.html">Untrusted: The Issue with Decentralisation</a></p>
|
||||
<h3>2022-06-30</h3>
|
||||
<p>#2 - <a class="body-link" href="blog/untrusted-the-issue-with-decentralisation.html">Untrusted: The Issue with Decentralisation</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h2>2022-01-29</h2>
|
||||
<p>#1 - <a href="blog/systemd-insecurity.html">systemd Insecurity</a></p>
|
||||
<h3>2022-01-29</h3>
|
||||
<p>#1 - <a class="body-link" href="blog/systemd-insecurity.html">systemd Insecurity</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h2>2022-01-27</h2>
|
||||
<p>#0 - <a href="blog/foss-is-working-against-itself.html">FOSS is Working Against Itself</a></p>
|
||||
<h3>2022-01-27</h3>
|
||||
<p>#0 - <a class="body-link" href="blog/foss-is-working-against-itself.html">FOSS is Working Against Itself</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="index.html">Back</a>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,6 +4,15 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Blog - FOSS is Working Against Itself</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="../infnet.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="../about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Blog - #0</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
@ -12,104 +21,107 @@
|
||||
<h3>2022-01-27 (UTC+00:00)</h3>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h4>Introduction</h4>
|
||||
<p>The world has become a dangerous, privacy invading, human rights stripping,<br>
|
||||
totalitarian place; in order to combat this, people are joining a growing,<br>
|
||||
and dangerous, trend, which I will refer to in this post as the "FOSS<br>
|
||||
movement".<br>
|
||||
With that stated, I will now debunk the misinformation being spread inside<br>
|
||||
<p>The world has become a dangerous, privacy invading, human rights stripping,
|
||||
totalitarian place; in order to combat this, people are joining a growing,
|
||||
and dangerous, trend, which I will refer to in this post as the "FOSS
|
||||
movement".
|
||||
With that stated, I will now debunk the misinformation being spread inside
|
||||
of this extremely flawed movement.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>The FOSS movement is an attempt to regain privacy and control over our<br>
|
||||
devices and data, but the entire concept of FOSS-only, at the current time,<br>
|
||||
is severely, and dangerously, flawed. What the FOSS community does not seem<br>
|
||||
to understand is the fact that most FOSS software cares not about security.<br>
|
||||
"Security"; keep that word in mind as you progress through this article.<br>
|
||||
What is security? Security is being safe and secure from adversaries and<br>
|
||||
unwanted consequences; security protects our rights and allows us to<br>
|
||||
protect ourselves. Without security, we have no protection, and without<br>
|
||||
protection, we have a lack of certainty of everything else, including<br>
|
||||
<p>The FOSS movement is an attempt to regain privacy and control over our
|
||||
devices and data, but the entire concept of FOSS-only, at the current time,
|
||||
is severely, and dangerously, flawed. What the FOSS community does not seem
|
||||
to understand is the fact that most FOSS software cares not about security.
|
||||
"Security"; keep that word in mind as you progress through this article.
|
||||
What is security? Security is being safe and secure from adversaries and
|
||||
unwanted consequences; security protects our rights and allows us to
|
||||
protect ourselves. Without security, we have no protection, and without
|
||||
protection, we have a lack of certainty of everything else, including
|
||||
privacy and control, which is what the FOSS movement is seeking.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>FOSS projects rarely take security into account; they simply look at the<br>
|
||||
surface level, rather than the actual root cause of the issues they are<br>
|
||||
attempting to fight against. In this case, the focus is on privacy and<br>
|
||||
control. Without security mechanisms to protect the privacy features and<br>
|
||||
the ability to control your devices and data, it can be stripped away as<br>
|
||||
if it never existed in the first place, which, inevitably, leads us back to<br>
|
||||
the beginning, and the cycle repeats. With this ideology, privacy and<br>
|
||||
control will *never* be achieved. There is no foundation to build privacy<br>
|
||||
or control upon. It is impossible to build a solid, freedom respecting<br>
|
||||
<p>FOSS projects rarely take security into account; they simply look at the
|
||||
surface level, rather than the actual root cause of the issues they are
|
||||
attempting to fight against. In this case, the focus is on privacy and
|
||||
control. Without security mechanisms to protect the privacy features and
|
||||
the ability to control your devices and data, it can be stripped away as
|
||||
if it never existed in the first place, which, inevitably, leads us back to
|
||||
the beginning, and the cycle repeats. With this ideology, privacy and
|
||||
control will *never* be achieved. There is no foundation to build privacy
|
||||
or control upon. It is impossible to build a solid, freedom respecting
|
||||
platform on this model.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h4>Example: Smartphones</h4>
|
||||
<p>A FOSS phone, especially so-called "Linux phones" are completely<br>
|
||||
detrimental to privacy and control, because they do not have the security<br>
|
||||
necessary to enforce that privacy. Unlocked bootloaders prevent the device<br>
|
||||
from verifying the integrity of the boot chain, including the OS, meaning<br>
|
||||
any big tech or government entity can simply inject malicious code into<br>
|
||||
your software and you wouldn't have any idea it was there. If that's not<br>
|
||||
enough of a backdoor for you to reconsider your position, how about the<br>
|
||||
trivial evil maid and data extraction attacks which could be executed on<br>
|
||||
your device, whether with coercion or not? With Android phones, this is<br>
|
||||
bad enough to completely break the privacy and control the FOSS movement<br>
|
||||
seeks, but "Linux phones" take it a step further by implementing barely any<br>
|
||||
security, if any at all. Privilege escalation is trivial to achieve on any<br>
|
||||
Linux system, which is the reason Linux hardening strategies often include<br>
|
||||
restricting access to the root account; if you root your Android phone, or<br>
|
||||
use a "Linux phone", you've already destroyed the security model, and thus<br>
|
||||
privacy and control model you were attempting to achieve. Not only are<br>
|
||||
these side effects of FOSS, so is the absolutely illogical restriction of<br>
|
||||
not being able to, or making it unnecessarily difficult to, install and<br>
|
||||
update critical components of the system, such as proprietary firmware,<br>
|
||||
which just so happens to be almost all of them. "Linux phones" are not as<br>
|
||||
<p>A FOSS phone, especially so-called "Linux phones" are completely
|
||||
detrimental to privacy and control, because they do not have the security
|
||||
necessary to enforce that privacy. Unlocked bootloaders prevent the device
|
||||
from verifying the integrity of the boot chain, including the OS, meaning
|
||||
any big tech or government entity can simply inject malicious code into
|
||||
your software and you wouldn't have any idea it was there. If that's not
|
||||
enough of a backdoor for you to reconsider your position, how about the
|
||||
trivial evil maid and data extraction attacks which could be executed on
|
||||
your device, whether with coercion or not? With Android phones, this is
|
||||
bad enough to completely break the privacy and control the FOSS movement
|
||||
seeks, but "Linux phones" take it a step further by implementing barely any
|
||||
security, if any at all. Privilege escalation is trivial to achieve on any
|
||||
Linux system, which is the reason Linux hardening strategies often include
|
||||
restricting access to the root account; if you root your Android phone, or
|
||||
use a "Linux phone", you've already destroyed the security model, and thus
|
||||
privacy and control model you were attempting to achieve. Not only are
|
||||
these side effects of FOSS, so is the absolutely illogical restriction of
|
||||
not being able to, or making it unnecessarily difficult to, install and
|
||||
update critical components of the system, such as proprietary firmware,
|
||||
which just so happens to be almost all of them. "Linux phones" are not as
|
||||
free as they proclaim to be.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>You may ask "What's so bad about using LineageOS?", to which I answer with<br>
|
||||
<p>You may ask "What's so bad about using LineageOS?", to which I answer with
|
||||
"What's not bad about it?".<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
- LineageOS uses debug builds, not safe and secure release builds.<br>
|
||||
- LineageOS requires an unlocked bootloader.<br>
|
||||
- LineageOS does not install critically important firmware without manual<br>
|
||||
flashing.<br>
|
||||
- LineageOS does not implement rollback protection, meaning any adversary,<br>
|
||||
including a goverment entity, can simply downgrade the OS to a previous<br>
|
||||
version in order to exploit known security vulnerabilities.<br>
|
||||
- LineageOS requires an unlocked bootloader. Even when installed on devices
|
||||
which support custom Android Verified Boot (AVB) keys, the bootloader cannot
|
||||
be locked due to lack of the OS being signed.<br>
|
||||
- LineageOS does not install critically important firmware without manual
|
||||
flashing, requiring users to perform a second update to install this firmware;
|
||||
this likely causes users to ignore the notification or miss firmware
|
||||
updates.<br>
|
||||
- LineageOS does not implement rollback protection, meaning any adversary,
|
||||
from a stranger who picks up the device, to a goverment entity remotely, can
|
||||
simply downgrade the OS to a previous version in order to exploit known
|
||||
security vulnerabilities.<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
LineageOS is not the only Android OS (commonly, and incorrectly, referred<br>
|
||||
to as a "ROM") with such issues, but it is one of the worst. The only<br>
|
||||
things such insecure OSes can provide you are customisation abilities, and<br>
|
||||
a backdoor to your data. They are best suited as a development OS, not a<br>
|
||||
LineageOS is not the only Android OS (commonly, and incorrectly, referred
|
||||
to as a "ROM") with such issues, but it is one of the worst. The only
|
||||
things such insecure OSes can provide you are customisation abilities, and
|
||||
a backdoor to your data. They are best suited as a development OS, not a
|
||||
production OS.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h4>Solution</h4>
|
||||
<p>What can you do about this? The answer is simple; however, it does require<br>
|
||||
you to use logic, fact, and evidence, not emotion, which is a difficult<br>
|
||||
pill for most people to swallow. Use your adversaries' weapons against<br>
|
||||
them. The only way to effectively combat the privacy invasion and lack of<br>
|
||||
control of our devices and data is to become a renegade and not take sides.<br>
|
||||
Yes, that means not taking sides with the closed source, proprietary, big<br>
|
||||
tech and government entities, but it also means not taking sides with any<br>
|
||||
FOSS entities. The only way to win this war is to take *whatever* hardware<br>
|
||||
<p>What can you do about this? The answer is simple; however, it does require
|
||||
you to use logic, fact, and evidence, not emotion, which is a difficult
|
||||
pill for most people to swallow. Use your adversaries' weapons against
|
||||
them. The only way to effectively combat the privacy invasion and lack of
|
||||
control of our devices and data is to become a renegade and not take sides.
|
||||
Yes, that means not taking sides with the closed source, proprietary, big
|
||||
tech and government entities, but it also means not taking sides with any
|
||||
FOSS entities. The only way to win this war is to take *whatever* hardware
|
||||
and software you can, and use it tactically.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>The only solution for phone security, privacy, and control, is to use<br>
|
||||
a Google Pixel (currently, 4 series or newer) running GrapheneOS. Google<br>
|
||||
Pixel phones allow you complete bootloader freedom, including the ability<br>
|
||||
to lock the bootloader after flashing a custom OS (GrapheneOS includes a<br>
|
||||
custom OS signing key to allow locking the bootloader and enabling verified<br>
|
||||
boot to prevent malware persistence, evil maid attacks, and boot chain<br>
|
||||
corruption), long device support lifecycles (minimum 3 years for Pixel 3a<br>
|
||||
series to Pixel 5a, minimum 5 years for Pixel 6 series), and fast,<br>
|
||||
guaranteed security updates for the entire support timeframe of the<br>
|
||||
<p>The only solution for phone security, privacy, and control, is to use
|
||||
a Google Pixel (currently, Pixel 4-series or newer) running GrapheneOS. Google
|
||||
Pixel phones allow you complete bootloader freedom, including the ability
|
||||
to lock the bootloader after flashing a custom OS (GrapheneOS includes a
|
||||
custom OS signing key to allow locking the bootloader and enabling verified
|
||||
boot to prevent malware persistence, evil maid attacks, and boot chain
|
||||
corruption), long device support lifecycles (minimum 3 years for Pixel 3a
|
||||
series to Pixel 5a, minimum 5 years for Pixel 6 series), and fast,
|
||||
guaranteed security updates for the entire support timeframe of the
|
||||
devices.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h4>Conclusion</h4>
|
||||
<p>Use what you can, and do what you can. By neglecting security, you are,<br>
|
||||
even if unintentionally, neglecting exactly what you are trying to gain;<br>
|
||||
<p>Use what you can, and do what you can. By neglecting security, you are,
|
||||
even if unintentionally, neglecting exactly what you are trying to gain;
|
||||
privacy and control.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="../blog.html">Back</a>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,79 +4,85 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Blog - systemd Insecurity</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="../infnet.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="../about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Blog - #1</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h2>systemd Insecurity</h2>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h3>2022-01-29 (UTC+00:00)</h3>
|
||||
<p>Posted: 2022-01-29 (UTC+00:00)</p>
|
||||
<p>Updated: 2022-10-29 (UTC+00:00)</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Anyone who cares about security may want to switch from systemd as soon as<br>
|
||||
possible; its lead developer doesn't care about your security at all, and<br>
|
||||
makes the thing seem like an intentional government backdoor if I've ever<br>
|
||||
seen one.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Anyone who cares about security may want to switch from systemd as soon as
|
||||
possible; its lead developer doesn't care about your security at all.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Poettering:<br>
|
||||
"You don't assign CVEs to every single random bugfix we do, do you?"</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>My thoughts:<br>
|
||||
Uhh... Yes, if they're security related.</p>
|
||||
Yes, if they're security related.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Source:<br>
|
||||
<a href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/5998">https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/5998</a></p>
|
||||
<a class="body-link" href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/5998">https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/5998</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Poettering:<br>
|
||||
"Humpf, I am not convinced this is the right way to announce this.<br>
|
||||
We never did that, and half the CVEs aren't useful anyway, hence I am not<br>
|
||||
sure we should start with that now, because it is either inherently<br>
|
||||
incomplete or blesses the nonsensical part of the CVE circus which we<br>
|
||||
"Humpf, I am not convinced this is the right way to announce this.
|
||||
We never did that, and half the CVEs aren't useful anyway, hence I am not
|
||||
sure we should start with that now, because it is either inherently
|
||||
incomplete or blesses the nonsensical part of the CVE circus which we
|
||||
really shouldn't bless..."</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>My thoughts:<br>
|
||||
CVEs are supposed to be for security, and a log of when they were<br>
|
||||
found and their severity, so yes, it *is* the correct way to announce it.<br>
|
||||
It seems as if over 95 security concious people think the same.</p>
|
||||
CVEs are supposed to be for security, and a log of when they were
|
||||
found and their severity, so yes, it *is* the correct way to announce it.
|
||||
It seems as if over 95 security-concious people think the same.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Source:<br>
|
||||
<a href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/6225">https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/6225</a></p>
|
||||
<a class="body-link" href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/6225">https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/6225</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Poettering:<br>
|
||||
"I am not sure I buy enough into the security circus to do that though for<br>
|
||||
"I am not sure I buy enough into the security circus to do that though for
|
||||
any minor issue..."</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Source:<br>
|
||||
<a href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/5144">https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/5144</a></p>
|
||||
<a class="body-link" href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/5144">https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/5144</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Poettering:<br>
|
||||
"Yes, as you found out "0day" is not a valid username. I wonder which tool<br>
|
||||
permitted you to create it in the first place. Note that not permitting<br>
|
||||
numeric first characters is done on purpose: to avoid ambiguities between<br>
|
||||
"Yes, as you found out "0day" is not a valid username. I wonder which tool
|
||||
permitted you to create it in the first place. Note that not permitting
|
||||
numeric first characters is done on purpose: to avoid ambiguities between
|
||||
numeric UID and textual user names.<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
systemd will validate all configuration data you drop at it, making it hard<br>
|
||||
to generate invalid configuration. Hence, yes, it's a feature that we don't<br>
|
||||
permit invalid user names, and I'd consider it a limitation of xinetd that<br>
|
||||
systemd will validate all configuration data you drop at it, making it hard
|
||||
to generate invalid configuration. Hence, yes, it's a feature that we don't
|
||||
permit invalid user names, and I'd consider it a limitation of xinetd that
|
||||
it doesn't refuse an invalid username.<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
So, yeah, I don't think there's anything to fix in systemd here. I<br>
|
||||
So, yeah, I don't think there's anything to fix in systemd here. I<
|
||||
understand this is annoying, but still: the username is clearly not valid."</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>My thoughts:<br>
|
||||
systemd was the thing that allowed root access just because a username<br>
|
||||
started with a number.</p>
|
||||
systemd was the thing that allowed root access just because a username
|
||||
started with a number, then Poettering blamed the user.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Source:<br>
|
||||
<a href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237">https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237</a></p>
|
||||
<a class="body-link" href="https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237">https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/6237</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="../blog.html">Back</a>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,128 +4,135 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Blog - Untrusted: The Issue with Decentralisation</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="../infnet.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="../about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Blog - #2</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h2>Untrusted: The Issue with Decentralisation</h2>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Posted: 2022-06-30 (UTC+00:00)</p>
|
||||
<p>Updated: 2022-06-30 (UTC+00:00)</p>
|
||||
<p>Updated: 2022-10-29 (UTC+00:00)</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h4>Introduction</h4>
|
||||
<p>A recent trend is seeing people move towards decentralised services and<br>
|
||||
platforms. While this is reasonable and I can understand why they are doing<br>
|
||||
such a thing, they are seemingly doing it without thinking about the<br>
|
||||
possible consequences of doing so. The issue with decentralisation is<br>
|
||||
trust; there is no way to pin a key to a specific person, to ensure that<br>
|
||||
you are communicating with the same person you are supposed to be<br>
|
||||
communicating with. In this article, I will discuss some of the security<br>
|
||||
<p>A recent trend is seeing people move towards decentralised services and
|
||||
platforms. While this is reasonable and I can understand why they are doing
|
||||
such a thing, they are seemingly doing it without thinking about the
|
||||
possible consequences of doing so. The issue with decentralisation is
|
||||
trust; there is no way to pin a key to a specific person, to ensure that
|
||||
you are communicating with the same person you are supposed to be
|
||||
communicating with. In this article, I will discuss some of the security
|
||||
issues with the decentralised model.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h4>Example: Messaging</h4>
|
||||
<p>When it comes to messaging your contacts on a centralised platform,<br>
|
||||
such as Twitter or Facebook, the keys are pinned to that user account,<br>
|
||||
using the user's password as the method of identification. This approach<br>
|
||||
makes it impossible to log in as a specific user without their password,<br>
|
||||
should it be strong enough to not be guessed, whether via personal guessing<br>
|
||||
or exhaustive search. The trust in this centralised model is the high<br>
|
||||
security these platforms have. It is extremely unlikely that anyone other<br>
|
||||
than a government would be able to access the accounts stored on such<br>
|
||||
platforms' servers, which makes the physical security trusted. As for<br>
|
||||
remote security, should a user's password be compromised, it can typically<br>
|
||||
be reset if the user can prove they are the owner of the account via some<br>
|
||||
form of identification; this is where the trust issue of decentralisation<br>
|
||||
<p>When it comes to messaging your contacts on a centralised platform,
|
||||
such as Twitter or Facebook, the keys are pinned to that user account,
|
||||
using the user's password as the method of identification. This approach
|
||||
makes it impossible to log in as a specific user without their password,
|
||||
should it be strong enough to not be guessed, whether via personal guessing
|
||||
or exhaustive search. The trust in this centralised model is the high
|
||||
security these platforms have. It is extremely unlikely that anyone other
|
||||
than a government would be able to access the accounts stored on such
|
||||
platforms' servers, which makes the physical security trusted. As for
|
||||
remote security, should a user's password be compromised, it can typically
|
||||
be reset if the user can prove they are the owner of the account via some
|
||||
form of identification; this is where the trust issue of decentralisation
|
||||
occurs.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>In the decentralised model, keys are kept on the users' devices, in their<br>
|
||||
possession. While this soveriegnty is welcomed, it introduces a critical<br>
|
||||
flaw in the security of communicating with anyone via a decentralised<br>
|
||||
platform; should a user's device be lost, stolen, or otherwise compromised,<br>
|
||||
there is no way to know it happened and what the new keys really are, and<br>
|
||||
if the same user generated those keys. There is no centralised point where<br>
|
||||
anyone can go to check if the compromised user has updated their keys,<br>
|
||||
which means there must already have been at least one other secure channel<br>
|
||||
in place before the compromise occurred. Even if there was, the security<br>
|
||||
of endpoint devices, especially typical users, is much lower than a well<br>
|
||||
protected corporation's servers, making even those secure channels<br>
|
||||
questionable to trust. Should all secure channels be compromised, there is<br>
|
||||
literally no way to know if the person you are communicating with is the<br>
|
||||
real person or an imposter; there is no root of trust. This point is fatal;<br>
|
||||
game over. The only way to establish trust again would be to physically<br>
|
||||
<p>In the decentralised model, keys are kept on the users' devices, in their
|
||||
possession. While this soveriegnty is welcomed, it introduces a critical
|
||||
flaw in the security of communicating with anyone via a decentralised
|
||||
platform; should a user's device be lost, stolen, or otherwise compromised,
|
||||
there is no way to know it happened and what the new keys really are, and
|
||||
if the same user generated those keys. There is no centralised point where
|
||||
anyone can go to check if the compromised user has updated their keys,
|
||||
which means there must already have been at least one other secure channel
|
||||
in place before the compromise occurred. Even if there was, the security
|
||||
of endpoint devices, especially typical users, is much lower than a well
|
||||
protected corporation's servers, making even those secure channels
|
||||
questionable to trust. Should all secure channels be compromised, there is
|
||||
literally no way to know if the person you are communicating with is the
|
||||
real person or an imposter; there is no root of trust. This point is fatal;
|
||||
game over. The only way to establish trust again would be to physically
|
||||
meet and exchange keys.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h4>Solution</h4>
|
||||
<p>I'll cut to the chase; there isn't a definitive solution. The best way<br>
|
||||
to handle this situation is to design your threat model and think about<br>
|
||||
your reasoning for avoiding centralised platforms. Is it lack of trust of<br>
|
||||
a specific company? Is it the possibility of centralised platforms going<br>
|
||||
offline? Only by thinking logically and tactically can you solve both the<br>
|
||||
issue of centralisation and decentralisation. Often, one size fits all is<br>
|
||||
<p>I'll cut to the chase; there isn't a definitive solution. The best way
|
||||
to handle this situation is to design your threat model and think about
|
||||
your reasoning for avoiding centralised platforms. Is it lack of trust of
|
||||
a specific company? Is it the possibility of centralised platforms going
|
||||
offline? Only by thinking logically and tactically can you solve both the
|
||||
issue of centralisation and decentralisation. Often, one size fits all is
|
||||
never the correct approach, nor does it typically work.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>In order to avoid the issue of loss of trust due to lack of root of trust,<br>
|
||||
all users' keys must be stored in a centralised location where all contacts<br>
|
||||
are able to go to in case of compromise or to periodically check the state<br>
|
||||
of keys and to see if they have changed. This centralised location requires<br>
|
||||
some sort of identification to ensure that the user changing their keys is<br>
|
||||
really the same person who initially signed up for the platform, using a<br>
|
||||
trust-on-first-use (TOFU) model, which isn't much different than what<br>
|
||||
today's centralised platforms are already doing; the only difference is who<br>
|
||||
<p>In order to avoid the issue of loss of trust due to lack of root of trust,
|
||||
all users' keys must be stored in a centralised location where all contacts
|
||||
are able to go to in case of compromise or to periodically check the state
|
||||
of keys and to see if they have changed. This centralised location requires
|
||||
some sort of identification to ensure that the user changing their keys is
|
||||
really the same person who initially signed up for the platform, using a
|
||||
trust-on-first-use (TOFU) model, which isn't much different than what
|
||||
today's centralised platforms are already doing; the only difference is who
|
||||
is controlling the location; trust is still present and required.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>In order to have a root of trust, I have posted my keys to my website,<br>
|
||||
<p>In order to have a root of trust, I have posted my keys to my website,
|
||||
which is protected by multiple layers of security:<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
1. I have provided identification to my domain name registrar, to ensure I<br>
|
||||
can access the website I rightfully own, should it be compromised, by<br>
|
||||
0. I have provided identification to my domain name registrar, to ensure I
|
||||
can access the website I rightfully own, should it be compromised, by
|
||||
providing identification to the domain name registrar.<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
2. I have provided identification to my virtual private server host, to<br>
|
||||
ensure I can access the virtual private servers I rightfully rent, should<br>
|
||||
they be compromised, by providing identification to the virtual private<br>
|
||||
1. I have provided identification to my virtual private server host, to
|
||||
ensure I can access the virtual private servers I rightfully rent, should
|
||||
they be compromised, by providing identification to the virtual private
|
||||
server host.<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
3. I have pinned my website to a globally trusted certificate authority,<br>
|
||||
Let's Encrypt, which is a trusted party to manage TLS certificates and<br>
|
||||
2. I have pinned my website to a globally trusted certificate authority,
|
||||
Let's Encrypt, which is a trusted party to manage TLS certificates and
|
||||
ensure ownership of the domain when connecting to it.<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
4. I have enabled DNSSEC on my domain, so it is extremely difficult to<br>
|
||||
spoof my domain to make you believe you're connecting to it when you're<br>
|
||||
3. I have enabled DNSSEC on my domain, so it is extremely difficult to
|
||||
spoof my domain to make you believe you're connecting to it when you're
|
||||
actually connecting to someone else's.<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
While not the most secure implementation of a root of trust, it is the<br>
|
||||
most secure implementation currently available to me. While the domain<br>
|
||||
name registrar or virtual private server host could tamper with my domain<br>
|
||||
and data, they are the most trustworthy parties available.<br>
|
||||
In its current form, decentralisation would make this impossible to<br>
|
||||
While not the most secure implementation of a root of trust, it is the
|
||||
most secure implementation currently available to me. While the domain
|
||||
name registrar or virtual private server host could tamper with my domain
|
||||
and data, they are the most trustworthy parties available.
|
||||
In its current form, decentralisation would make this impossible to
|
||||
implement in any form.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h4>Conclusion</h4>
|
||||
<p>Do not demand anonymity; demand privacy and control of your own data.<br>
|
||||
Complete anonymity makes it impossible to have a root of trust, and is<br>
|
||||
typically never necessary. It is possible for someone else to hold your<br>
|
||||
keys, without them taking control of them and dictating what you can and<br>
|
||||
cannot do (Twitter's misinformation policy comes to mind). If a platform<br>
|
||||
is not listening to your or other people's concerns about how it is being<br>
|
||||
run, show those platforms that you will not stand for it, and move to a<br>
|
||||
different one. This may not be ideal, but it's not different to moving from<br>
|
||||
one decentralised platform to another. Centralisation is not what is evil,<br>
|
||||
the people in control of the platforms are what is potentially evil.<br>
|
||||
Carefully, logically, and tactically, choose who to trust. Decentralisation<br>
|
||||
doesn't do much for trust when you must still trust the operator of the<br>
|
||||
decentralised platform, and are still subject to the possibly draconian<br>
|
||||
policies of that decentralised platform. If government is what you are<br>
|
||||
trying to avoid, there is no denying it is feasibly impossible to avoid it;<br>
|
||||
a government could always take down the decentralised platform, forcing you<br>
|
||||
to move to another, and they could also take down the centralised key<br>
|
||||
storage site mentioned earlier in this article. A government is not<br>
|
||||
something you can so easily avoid. Decentralisation does not solve the<br>
|
||||
government issue. In order to live a happy, fun, and fulfilled life, while<br>
|
||||
protecting yourself against logical threats, there are only two words you<br>
|
||||
<p>Do not demand anonymity; demand privacy and control of your own data.
|
||||
Complete anonymity makes it impossible to have a root of trust, and is
|
||||
typically never necessary. It is possible for someone else to hold your
|
||||
keys, without them taking control of them and dictating what you can and
|
||||
cannot do (Twitter's misinformation policy comes to mind). If a platform
|
||||
is not listening to your or other people's concerns about how it is being
|
||||
run, show those platforms that you will not stand for it, and move to a
|
||||
different one. This may not be ideal, but it's not different to moving from
|
||||
one decentralised platform to another. Centralisation is not what is evil,
|
||||
the people in control of the platforms are what is potentially evil.
|
||||
Carefully, logically, and tactically, choose who to trust. Decentralisation
|
||||
doesn't do much for trust when you must still trust the operator of the
|
||||
decentralised platform, and are still subject to the possibly draconian
|
||||
policies of that decentralised platform. If government is what you are
|
||||
trying to avoid, there is no denying it is feasibly impossible to avoid it;
|
||||
a government could always take down the decentralised platform, forcing you
|
||||
to move to another, and they could also take down the centralised key
|
||||
storage site mentioned earlier in this article. A government is not
|
||||
something you can so easily avoid. Decentralisation does not solve the
|
||||
government issue. In order to live a happy, fun, and fulfilled life, while
|
||||
protecting yourself against logical threats, there are only two words you
|
||||
must live by: Threat model.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="../blog.html">Back</a>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
47
contact.html
47
contact.html
@ -4,34 +4,53 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Contact</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="infnet.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Contact</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h2>E2EE contact methods</h2>
|
||||
<h2>E2EE Contact Methods</h2>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h3>Preferred</h3>
|
||||
<p>Whenever possible, use the following contact methods;<br>
|
||||
they allow verification to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks,<br>
|
||||
<p>Whenever possible, use the following contact methods;
|
||||
they allow verification to mitigate man-in-the-middle attacks,
|
||||
have solid security, and reasonable privacy.<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Use the keys for each contact method to verify my devices.<br>
|
||||
Note that verification does not verify a person, only their devices,<br>
|
||||
<p>Use the keys for each contact method to verify my devices.
|
||||
Note that verification does not verify a person, only their devices,
|
||||
and can be defeated via coercion or other force.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="contact/signal.html">Signal</a><p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="contact/xmpp.html">XMPP</a><p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="contact/threema.html">Threema</a></p>
|
||||
<p><img class="logo" src="contact/signal.png" width="30px" height="30px"/> <a class="body-link" href="contact/signal.html">Signal</a><p>
|
||||
<p><img class="logo" src="contact/xmpp.png" width="30px" height="30px"/> <a class="body-link" href="contact/xmpp.html">XMPP</a><p>
|
||||
<p><img class="logo" src="contact/threema.png" width="30px" height="30px"/> <a class="body-link" href="contact/threema.html">Threema</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h3>Metadata-free</h3>
|
||||
<p>If metadata leakage is an issue for you, you can use the following<br>
|
||||
contact methods. Note that these services do not have verification<br>
|
||||
functionality, and will be treated as less secure.</p>
|
||||
<p>If metadata leakage is an issue for you, you can use the following
|
||||
contact methods. Note that these services do not have verification
|
||||
functionality, and will be treated as less secure; unless you really
|
||||
need to use these services, use a preferred method instead.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="contact/briar.html">Briar</a></p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="contact/session.html">Session</a></p>
|
||||
<p><img class="logo" src="contact/briar.png" width="30px" height="30px"/> <a class="body-link" href="contact/briar.html">Briar</a></p>
|
||||
<p><img class="logo" src="contact/session.png" width="30px" height="30px"/> <a class="body-link" href="contact/session.html">Session</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="index.html">Back</a>
|
||||
<h2>Non-private Methods</h2>
|
||||
<p>The following contact methods do not utilise end-to-end encryption,
|
||||
or I do not use such functionality; they are suitable for public contact
|
||||
only, including directly and groups. Do not use these methods if
|
||||
confidentiality and/or privacy is required.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p><img class="logo" src="contact/pleroma.png" width="30px" height="30px"/> <a class="body-link" href="https://plr.inferencium.net/inference/">Fediverse</a></p>
|
||||
<p><img class="logo" src="contact/twitter.png" width="30px" height="30px"/> <a class="body-link" href="https://twitter.com/inferenceus/">Twitter</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,6 +4,15 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Contact - Briar</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="../infnet.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="../about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Contact</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
@ -18,7 +27,5 @@ Unavailable
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="../contact.html">Back</a>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
contact/briar.png
Normal file
BIN
contact/briar.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 9.9 KiB |
BIN
contact/pleroma.png
Normal file
BIN
contact/pleroma.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 1.6 KiB |
@ -4,6 +4,15 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Contact - Session</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="../infnet.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="../about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Contact</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
@ -18,7 +27,5 @@
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="../contact.html">Back</a>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
contact/session.png
Normal file
BIN
contact/session.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 18 KiB |
@ -4,6 +4,15 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Contact - Signal</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="../infnet.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="../about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Contact</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
@ -18,7 +27,5 @@
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="../contact.html">Back</a>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
contact/signal.png
Normal file
BIN
contact/signal.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 42 KiB |
@ -4,6 +4,15 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Contact - Threema</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="../infnet.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="../about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Contact</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
@ -16,7 +25,5 @@
|
||||
<img src="key-threema.png">
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="../contact.html">Back</a>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
contact/threema.png
Normal file
BIN
contact/threema.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 8.0 KiB |
BIN
contact/twitter.png
Normal file
BIN
contact/twitter.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 3.4 KiB |
@ -4,6 +4,15 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Contact - XMPP</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href="../infnet.css">
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="../about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="../source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Contact</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
@ -11,8 +20,8 @@
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Updated: 2022-10-13 (UTC+00:00)</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Whenever possible, open the links to pin the fingerprint directly from<br>
|
||||
this webpage. If that is not possible, manually verify the fingerprints.</p>
|
||||
<p>Whenever possible, open the links to pin the fingerprint directly from this
|
||||
webpage. If that is not possible, manually verify the fingerprints.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h3>inference@inferencium.net</h3>
|
||||
<h4>Key</h4>
|
||||
@ -22,7 +31,7 @@ this webpage. If that is not possible, manually verify the fingerprints.</p>
|
||||
1bd03c6a 5e011655 2fafd697 da4fce70 63de5a83 a264a34a fcce78fe 6b06820c
|
||||
</code>
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<a href="xmpp:inference@inferencium.net?omemo-sid-1586888206=1bd03c6a5e0116552fafd697da4fce7063de5a83a264a34afcce78fe6b06820c">xmpp:inference@inferencium.net?omemo-sid-1586888206=1bd03c6a5e0116552fafd697da4fce7063de5a83a264a34afcce78fe6b06820c</a>
|
||||
<a class="body-link" href="xmpp:inference@inferencium.net?omemo-sid-1586888206=1bd03c6a5e0116552fafd697da4fce7063de5a83a264a34afcce78fe6b06820c">xmpp:inference@inferencium.net?omemo-sid-1586888206=1bd03c6a5e0116552fafd697da4fce7063de5a83a264a34afcce78fe6b06820c</a>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<h5>Desktop</h5>
|
||||
@ -41,10 +50,9 @@ this webpage. If that is not possible, manually verify the fingerprints.</p>
|
||||
9f9b50e4 3bb5ae5d 886213ad 43015719 7c40aa99 e436445d e0e360a9 24076015
|
||||
</code>
|
||||
</pre>
|
||||
<a href="xmpp:inference@plus.st?omemo-sid-1890454018=9f9b50e43bb5ae5d886213ad430157197c40aa99e436445de0e360a924076015">xmpp:inference@plus.st?omemo-sid-1890454018=9f9b50e43bb5ae5d886213ad430157197c40aa99e436445de0e360a924076015</a>
|
||||
<a class="body-link" href="xmpp:inference@plus.st?omemo-sid-1890454018=9f9b50e43bb5ae5d886213ad430157197c40aa99e436445de0e360a924076015">xmpp:inference@plus.st?omemo-sid-1890454018=9f9b50e43bb5ae5d886213ad430157197c40aa99e436445de0e360a924076015</a>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="../contact.html">Back</a>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
BIN
contact/xmpp.png
Normal file
BIN
contact/xmpp.png
Normal file
Binary file not shown.
|
After Width: | Height: | Size: 30 KiB |
15
index.html
15
index.html
@ -4,12 +4,15 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href=infnet.css>
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Inferencium Network</h1>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="about.html">About</a></p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="contact.html">Contact</a></p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="blog.html">Blog</a></p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="source.html">Source</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
86
infnet.css
86
infnet.css
@ -1,50 +1,88 @@
|
||||
.sidebar {
|
||||
height: 100%;
|
||||
width: 250px;
|
||||
position: fixed;
|
||||
left: 0;
|
||||
top: 0;
|
||||
padding-top: 55px;
|
||||
background-color: #909090;
|
||||
text-align: center;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.sidebar div {
|
||||
padding: 8px;
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 24px;
|
||||
display: block;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.title {
|
||||
padding: 8px;
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 32px;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.body-link {
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 18px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
.logo {
|
||||
transform: translate(0px, 8px);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
body {
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
background-color: #262626;
|
||||
padding-top: 40px;
|
||||
margin-left: 400px;
|
||||
margin-right: 150px;
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
background-color: #262626;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h1 {
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 24px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 26px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h2 {
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 22px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 22px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h3 {
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 20px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 20px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h4 {
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 18px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 18px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
h5 {
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 16px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 16px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
p {
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 16px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
font-size: 16px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
code {
|
||||
font-size: 14px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
font-size: 14px;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
a {
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
color: #ffffff;
|
||||
font-family: Roboto, sans-serif;
|
||||
color: #000000;
|
||||
text-decoration: none;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
35
source.html
35
source.html
@ -4,26 +4,35 @@
|
||||
<title>Inferencium Network - Source</title>
|
||||
<link rel="stylesheet" href=infnet.css>
|
||||
</head>
|
||||
<div class="sidebar">
|
||||
<a class="title">Inferencium Network</a><br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<div><a href="about.html">About</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="contact.html">Contact</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="blog.html">Blog</a></div>
|
||||
<div><a href="source.html">Source</a></div>
|
||||
</div>
|
||||
<body>
|
||||
<h1>Source</h1>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Inferencium Network Git repository.</p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="https://codeberg.org/inference/">Git repository</a></p>
|
||||
<h3>My Personal Source Code Repositories</h3>
|
||||
<p>These repositories contain source code which is used on my personal
|
||||
systems.<br>
|
||||
No guarantees are made that they will work correctly on your systems, and are
|
||||
not targeted towards a public release.<br>
|
||||
Usage of these repositories is at your own risk.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Inferencium Network website source code.</p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="https://codeberg.org/inference/infnet-www/">Website</a></p>
|
||||
<p>- <a class="body-link" href="https://git.inferencium.net/inference/cfg/">Configuration files</a></p>
|
||||
<p>- <a class="body-link" href="https://git.inferencium.net/inference/scr/">Script files</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>My personal configuration files.</p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="https://codeberg.org/inference/cfg/">Configuration files</a></p>
|
||||
<h3>Inferencium Network Source Code Repositories</h3>
|
||||
<p>These repositories contain source code targeted at a public release and are
|
||||
suitable for a wide range of systems.</p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>My personal script files.</p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="https://codeberg.org/inference/scr/">Scripts</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<p>Inferencium Network Gentoo overlay.</p>
|
||||
<p>- <a href="https://codeberg.org/inference/inferencium/">Inferencium Gentoo overlay</a></p>
|
||||
<p>- <a class="body-link" href="https://git.inferencium.net/inference/inf-www/">Website</a></p>
|
||||
<p>- <a class="body-link" href="https://git.inferencium.net/inference/mmd/">Gentoo - Multimedia</a></p>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<br>
|
||||
<a href="index.html">Back</a></p>
|
||||
</body>
|
||||
</html>
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
x
Reference in New Issue
Block a user