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<!DOCTYPE html> <!DOCTYPE html>
<!-- Inferencium - Website - Blog - #2 --> <!-- Inferencium - Website - Blog - #2 -->
<!-- Version: 9.0.0 --> <!-- Version: 9.0.1 -->
<!-- Copyright 2022 Jake Winters --> <!-- Copyright 2022 Jake Winters -->
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</nav> </nav>
<section id="introduction"> <section id="introduction">
<h2><a href="#introduction">Introduction</a></h2> <h2><a href="#introduction">Introduction</a></h2>
<p>A recent trend is seeing people move towards decentralised services and <p>A recent trend is seeing people move towards decentralised services and platforms. While this
platforms. While this is reasonable and I can understand why they are doing such is reasonable and I can understand why they are doing such a thing, they are seemingly doing it
a thing, they are seemingly doing it without thinking about the possible without thinking about the possible consequences of doing so. The issue with decentralisation is
consequences of doing so. The issue with decentralisation is trust; there is no trust; there is no way to pin a key to a specific person, to ensure that you are communicating
way to pin a key to a specific person, to ensure that you are communicating with with the same person you are supposed to be communicating with. In this article, I will discuss
the same person you are supposed to be communicating with. In this article, I some of the security issues with the decentralised model.</p>
will discuss some of the security issues with the decentralised model.</p>
</section> </section>
<section id="examples"> <section id="examples">
<h2><a href="#examples">Examples</a></h2> <h2><a href="#examples">Examples</a></h2>
<section id="examples-messaging"> <section id="examples-messaging">
<h3><a href="#examples-messaging">Messaging</a></h3> <h3><a href="#examples-messaging">Messaging</a></h3>
<p>When it comes to messaging your contacts on a centralised <p>When it comes to messaging your contacts on a centralised platform, such as Twitter
platform, such as Twitter or Facebook, the keys are pinned to or Facebook, the keys are pinned to that user account, using the user's password as the
that user account, using the user's password as the method of method of identification. This approach makes it impossible to log in as a specific user
identification. This approach makes it impossible to log in as a without their password, should it be strong enough to not be guessed, whether via
specific user without their password, should it be strong enough personal guessing or exhaustive search. The trust in this centralised model is the high
to not be guessed, whether via personal guessing or exhaustive security these platforms have. It is extremely unlikely that anyone other than a
search. The trust in this centralised model is the high security government would be able to access the accounts stored on such platforms' servers, which
these platforms have. It is extremely unlikely that anyone other makes the physical security trusted. As for remote security, should a user's password be
than a government would be able to access the accounts stored on compromised, it can typically be reset if the user can prove they are the owner of the
such platforms' servers, which makes the physical security account via some form of identification; this is where the trust issue of
trusted. As for remote security, should a user's password be
compromised, it can typically be reset if the user can prove
they are the owner of the account via some form of
identification; this is where the trust issue of
decentralisation occurs.</p> decentralisation occurs.</p>
<p>In the decentralised model, keys are kept on the users' <p>In the decentralised model, keys are kept on the users' devices, in their possession.
devices, in their possession. While this soveriegnty is While this soveriegnty is welcomed, it introduces a critical flaw in the security of
welcomed, it introduces a critical flaw in the security of communicating with anyone via a decentralised platform; should a user's device be lost,
communicating with anyone via a decentralised platform; should a stolen, or otherwise compromised, there is no way to know it happened and what the new
user's device be lost, stolen, or otherwise compromised, there keys really are, and if the same user generated those keys. There is no centralised
is no way to know it happened and what the new keys really are, point where anyone can go to check if the compromised user has updated their keys, which
and if the same user generated those keys. There is no means there must already have been at least one other secure channel in place before the
centralised point where anyone can go to check if the compromise occurred. Even if there was, the security of endpoint devices, especially
compromised user has updated their keys, which means there must typical users, is much lower than a well protected corporation's servers, making even
already have been at least one other secure channel in place those secure channels questionable to trust. Should all secure channels be compromised,
before the compromise occurred. Even if there was, the security there is literally no way to know if the person you are communicating with is the real
of endpoint devices, especially typical users, is much lower person or an imposter; there is no root of trust. This point is fatal; game over. The
than a well protected corporation's servers, making even those only way to establish trust again would be to physically meet and exchange keys.</p>
secure channels questionable to trust. Should all secure
channels be compromised, there is literally no way to know if
the person you are communicating with is the real person or an
imposter; there is no root of trust. This point is fatal; game
over. The only way to establish trust again would be to
physically meet and exchange keys.</p>
</section> </section>
</section> </section>
<section id="solution"> <section id="solution">
<h2><a href="#solution">Solution</a></h2> <h2><a href="#solution">Solution</a></h2>
<p>I'll cut to the chase; there isn't a definitive solution. The best way to <p>I'll cut to the chase; there isn't a definitive solution. The best way to handle this
handle this situation is to design your threat model and think about your situation is to design your threat model and think about your reasoning for avoiding centralised
reasoning for avoiding centralised platforms. Is it lack of trust of a specific platforms. Is it lack of trust of a specific company? Is it the possibility of centralised
company? Is it the possibility of centralised platforms going offline? Only by platforms going offline? Only by thinking logically and tactically can you solve both the issue
thinking logically and tactically can you solve both the issue of centralisation of centralisation and decentralisation. Often, one size fits all is never the correct approach,
and decentralisation. Often, one size fits all is never the correct approach,
nor does it typically work.</p> nor does it typically work.</p>
<p>In order to avoid the issue of loss of trust due to lack of root of trust, <p>In order to avoid the issue of loss of trust due to lack of root of trust, all users' keys
all users' keys must be stored in a centralised location where all contacts are must be stored in a centralised location where all contacts are able to go to in case of
able to go to in case of compromise or to periodically check the state of keys compromise or to periodically check the state of keys and to see if they have changed. This
and to see if they have changed. This centralised location requires some sort of centralised location requires some sort of identification to ensure that the user changing their
identification to ensure that the user changing their keys is really the same keys is really the same person who initially signed up for the platform, using a
person who initially signed up for the platform, using a trust-on-first-use trust-on-first-use (TOFU) model, which isn't much different than what today's centralised
(TOFU) model, which isn't much different than what today's centralised platforms platforms are already doing; the only difference is who is controlling the location; trust is
are already doing; the only difference is who is controlling the location; trust still present and required.</p>
is still present and required.</p>
<p>In order to have a root of trust, I have posted my keys to my website, which <p>In order to have a root of trust, I have posted my keys to my website, which
is protected by multiple layers of security: is protected by multiple layers of security:</p>
<ol> <ol>
<li>I have provided identification to my domain name registrar, <li>I have provided identification to my domain name registrar, to ensure I can access
to ensure I can access the website I rightfully own, should it the website I rightfully own, should it be compromised, by providing identification to
be compromised, by providing identification to the domain name the domain name registrar.</li>
registrar.</li> <li>I have provided identification to my virtual private server host, to ensure I can
<li>I have provided identification to my virtual private server access the virtual private servers I rightfully rent, should they be compromised, by
host, to ensure I can access the virtual private servers I providing identification to the virtual private server host.</li>
rightfully rent, should they be compromised, by providing <li>I have pinned my website to a globally trusted certificate authority, Let's Encrypt,
identification to the virtual private server host.</li> which is a trusted party to manage TLS certificates and ensure ownership of the domain
<li>I have pinned my website to a globally trusted certificate when connecting to it.</li>
authority, Let's Encrypt, which is a trusted party to manage TLS <li>I have enabled DNSSEC on my domain, so it is extremely difficult to spoof my domain
certificates and ensure ownership of the domain when connecting to make you believe you're connecting to it when you're actually connecting to someone
to it.</li>
<li>I have enabled DNSSEC on my domain, so it is extremely
difficult to spoof my domain to make you believe you're
connecting to it when you're actually connecting to someone
else's.</li> else's.</li>
</ol> </ol>
</p> <p>While not the most secure implementation of a root of trust, it is the most secure
<p>While not the most secure implementation of a root of trust, it is the most implementation currently available to me. While the domain name registrar or virtual private
secure implementation currently available to me. While the domain name registrar server host could tamper with my domain and data, they are the most trustworthy parties
or virtual private server host could tamper with my domain and data, they are available. In its current form, decentralisation would make this impossible to implement in any
the most trustworthy parties available. In its current form, decentralisation form.</p>
would make this impossible to implement in any form.</p>
</section> </section>
<section id="conclusion"> <section id="conclusion">
<h2><a href="#conclusion">Conclusion</a></h2> <h2><a href="#conclusion">Conclusion</a></h2>
<p>Do not demand anonymity; demand privacy and control of your own data. <p>Do not demand anonymity; demand privacy and control of your own data. Complete anonymity
Complete anonymity makes it impossible to have a root of trust, and is typically makes it impossible to have a root of trust, and is typically never necessary. It is possible
never necessary. It is possible for someone else to hold your keys, without them for someone else to hold your keys, without them taking control of them and dictating what you
taking control of them and dictating what you can and cannot do (X's can and cannot do (X's misinformation policy comes to mind). If a platform is not listening to
misinformation policy comes to mind). If a platform is not listening to your or your or other people's concerns about how it is being run, show those platforms that you will
other people's concerns about how it is being run, show those platforms that you not stand for it, and move to a different one. This may not be ideal, but it's not different to
will not stand for it, and move to a different one. This may not be ideal, but moving from one decentralised platform to another. Centralisation is not what is evil, the
it's not different to moving from one decentralised platform to another. people in control of the platforms are what is potentially evil. Carefully, logically, and
Centralisation is not what is evil, the people in control of the platforms are tactically, choose who to trust. Decentralisation doesn't do much for trust when you must still
what is potentially evil. Carefully, logically, and tactically, choose who to trust the operator of the decentralised platform, and are still subject to the possibly
trust. Decentralisation doesn't do much for trust when you must still trust the draconian policies of that decentralised platform. If government is what you are trying to
operator of the decentralised platform, and are still subject to the possibly avoid, there is no denying it is feasibly impossible to avoid it; a government could always take
draconian policies of that decentralised platform. If government is what you are down the decentralised platform, forcing you to move to another, and they could also take down
trying to avoid, there is no denying it is feasibly impossible to avoid it; a the centralised key storage site mentioned earlier in this article. A government is not
government could always take down the decentralised platform, forcing you to something you can so easily avoid. Decentralisation does not solve the government issue. In
move to another, and they could also take down the centralised key storage site order to live a happy, fun, and fulfilled life, while protecting yourself against logical
mentioned earlier in this article. A government is not something you can so
easily avoid. Decentralisation does not solve the government issue. In order to
live a happy, fun, and fulfilled life, while protecting yourself against logical
threats, there are only two words you must live by: Threat model.</p> threats, there are only two words you must live by: Threat model.</p>
</section> </section>
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